
America's Secret War: How Washington Armed Both Sides
Apr 20, 2026
6 min read · Intermediate

The Iran-Iraq War ended without resolving any underlying disputes. Yet it set precedents—chemical weapons, ballistic missiles as terror, great-power protection of despots—that defined the region for decades.
When the guns finally fell silent in August 1988, the Iran-Iraq War left behind a region transformed but not stabilized. The conflict had redefined the Middle East in ways that would ripple through the next three decades. Saddam emerged weakened but intact. Iran emerged with intact revolutionary ideology but a devastated military. The great powers that had armed both sides waited to see what came next.
Iraq emerged from the war in a precarious economic position. The conflict had cost an estimated $250-300 billion—a sum that Iraq had financed through loans from Arab states and the Soviet Union. The country's infrastructure was damaged. Oil production capacity had been reduced. Yet Iraq's debt burden remained enormous.
Saddam owed billions to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, Gulf states that had bankrolled Iraq's war effort. He owed billions to the Soviet Union. He owed billions to other states and private creditors. The debts were unsustainable, and there was no realistic way Iraq could repay them through economic growth.
This debt burden would shape Saddam's decisions in the aftermath of the war. Facing an insolvency crisis, he would look for ways to recapture resources quickly. He would attempt to consolidate control over his own economy. And eventually, he would invade Kuwait in an attempt to resolve the debt crisis by annexing another nation's oil wealth.
The human cost of the war was staggering. Estimates suggest that approximately one million people died—400,000 Iraqi military casualties, 300,000 Iranian military casualties, and large numbers of civilians from both sides. The figure is almost impossible to comprehend.
By way of comparison: the total American deaths in the Vietnam War were about 58,000. The Iran-Iraq War killed seventeen times that number. Yet it received a fraction of the international attention that Vietnam did.
Beyond the dead were the wounded and disabled. Estimates suggest that 2-3 million people were injured during the war. Many suffered permanent disabilities. The psychological trauma of eight years of grinding warfare affected tens of millions—soldiers, civilians, families.
The Iran-Iraq War established the precedent that chemical weapons could be used in warfare without serious international consequences. Iraq used chemical weapons repeatedly—against Iran, against Iranian Kurds, and against Iraq's own Kurdish population.
The international community protested but took no effective action. Iraq's use of chemical weapons went essentially unpunished. This set a dangerous precedent: a nation willing to defy international law by using weapons of mass destruction could do so with relative impunity if it had sufficient diplomatic protection from great powers.
The precedent would haunt the Middle East. When Iraq used chemical weapons again in 1990 and 1991, the international community was less shocked. When Syria, another Arab state, eventually developed chemical weapons capabilities, it did so knowing that Iraq had used them without facing serious consequences.
The Iran-Iraq War demonstrated that revolutionary Islam, with all its fervor and willingness to accept martyrdom, could not overcome conventional military power. Iran had mobilized millions of citizens, sent wave after wave of fighters into battle, and demonstrated extraordinary national commitment to the revolutionary cause.
Yet Iran had lost. Not decisively—the borders were roughly where they started. But Iran had failed to achieve its objective of overthrowing Saddam and exporting revolution to Iraq. The war's outcome suggested that revolutionary ideology, while powerful for national mobilization, could not substitute for military technology, training, and resources.
This lesson would shape Iran's military doctrine for decades. The revolutionary enthusiasm that had driven the early years of the war gave way to a more pragmatic assessment of military capability. Iran would seek to develop missiles, weapons, and technological sophistication rather than relying on massed manpower.
The Iran-Iraq War ended in 1988 but left no enduring resolution. The fundamental disputes between Iraq and Iran—over the Shatt al-Arab waterway, over regional influence, over ideology—remained unresolved. The ceasefire was a pause, not a peace settlement.
For Saddam, the pause was temporary. Within two years, Iraq would invade Kuwait. The invasion would bring American military power into the region and would set in motion a chain of events that would define Middle Eastern politics for the next 15 years.
For Iran, the ceasefire meant withdrawal from active military conflict but not an end to regional competition with Iraq. Iran would spend the 1990s rebuilding its military and expanding its influence through proxies and alliances.
The Iran-Iraq War established precedents that would shape future Middle Eastern conflicts. It showed that:—Chemical weapons could be used on civilians with impunity if sufficient great-power protection was available—Ballistic missiles could be used as terror weapons against cities—Naval commerce warfare could inflict economic costs on larger powers—Revolutionary ideology could be weaponized to mobilize populations for mass sacrifice—Great powers would support despots if geopolitical interests aligned
All of these lessons would be relevant in subsequent Middle Eastern conflicts. The war did not end the region's conflicts; it merely set the template for how future conflicts would be waged.
One of the most striking features of the Iran-Iraq War was the near-complete absence of international accountability. No trials were held for war crimes. No reparations were paid. No serious investigations were conducted into chemical weapons use, mass killings of civilians, or attacks on merchant shipping.
This absence of accountability reflected the Cold War reality that great powers protected their regional allies from international justice. It also reflected the weakness of international institutions in enforcing norms around warfare.
The lack of accountability meant that perpetrators of atrocities faced no consequences. For those who had lost family members in chemical weapons attacks, for the Kurdish victims of genocide, for the millions displaced by war, the lack of accountability was a profound injustice.
The Middle East of the 1990s inherited the wreckage of the Iran-Iraq War. Iraq, militarized and indebted, would launch its invasion of Kuwait in 1990. Iran, exhausted but intact, would gradually rebuild. The Gulf states, traumatized by the war's proximity and terrified of both Iraq and Iran, would continue to rely on great-power protection.
The Iran-Iraq War was not, in the end, a defining moment that transformed the region or the world. It was instead a catastrophic waste of human life and resources that fundamentally weakened two regional powers and left all outstanding disputes unresolved. Yet its legacy persisted in the minds of regional leaders, in the arsenals of states that had developed weapons during the conflict, and in the collective trauma of millions who had lived through eight years of war.
For those seeking to understand the modern Middle East and the sources of regional conflict, the Iran-Iraq War remains essential. The war did not create the grievances between Iraq and Iran, but it certainly deepened them. The war did not create chemical weapons proliferation in the Middle East, but it normalized their use. The war did not create the instability that would define the 1990s and 2000s, but it set many of the precedents and provided many of the lessons that leaders would draw upon.
Journal of Strategic Studies, 2008
Middle Eastern Studies, 2002
Security Studies, 2005
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