
Child Soldiers of the Basij: Iran's Human Mine Detectors
Apr 20, 2026
4 min read · Intermediate

While publicly neutral, the US tilted toward Iraq, shared intelligence, and overlooked chemical weapons use. The Iran-Contra scandal revealed some of this hidden history of American complicity.
The United States did not openly enter the Iran-Iraq War as a belligerent, yet American support for Iraq, American intelligence sharing, and American diplomatic cover transformed the conflict. The Iran-Contra scandal revealed some of this hidden history, but the full extent of American involvement in arming and advising Saddam Hussein remained largely obscured from public view.
President Ronald Reagan's administration made a strategic decision early in the war to tilt toward Iraq. The Iranian Revolution had humiliated America, seized its embassy, held its diplomats hostage, and aligned itself with the Soviet Union. An Iran weakened by war with Iraq served American interests.
This tilting took multiple forms. First, the US did not enforce the international arms embargo against Iraq as strictly as it did against Iran. American companies, sometimes with CIA knowledge and involvement, supplied Iraq with technology and precursor chemicals for weapons production.
More significantly, the US shared military intelligence with Iraq. American satellite imagery showed Iranian military deployments, allowing Iraqi forces to plan more effective operations. This intelligence advantage was crucial in several battles, particularly in the latter stages of the war when Iraq was trying to regain the initiative against Iranian offensives.
The intelligence sharing was managed by senior intelligence officials and authorized at the highest levels of the Reagan administration. It was not unauthorized freelancing by rogue intelligence officers—it was policy.
The Iran-Contra scandal, which broke in 1986, revealed that while the US was tilting toward Iraq, it was simultaneously conducting secret arms sales to Iran. These sales violated an explicit arms embargo and contradicted American foreign policy. The scandal's emergence forced the Reagan administration to answer uncomfortable questions about its objectives and methods.
The explanation offered was that the Iran arms sales were aimed at opening diplomatic channels to a more moderate faction within the Iranian government. The proceeds were diverted to support anti-communist rebels in Nicaragua. It was a foreign policy scheme of remarkable complexity and questionable legality.
The full extent of American complicity in Iraq's chemical weapons program remained classified for years. What eventually emerged was that American companies, with government knowledge, supplied Iraq with precursor chemicals and equipment. When Iraq used chemical weapons against Iran and its own Kurdish population, American officials muted criticism and blocked UN sanctions.
At one point, when US officials learned that Iraq planned to use chemical weapons against Iranian cities, the reaction was not to threaten sanctions or intervention but to warn Iraq about the risk of international backlash. The message was not 'don't use chemical weapons' but 'be careful about how you use them.'
By the time the Iran-Iraq War ended, it was clear that American policy had supported the side that used chemical weapons against civilians, waged war of terror against cities, and conducted genocide against the Kurdish population. Yet from the perspective of Cold War strategists in Washington, supporting Iraq made geopolitical sense.
Iran was the greater threat—revolutionary, hostile to American interests, and potentially backed by the Soviet Union. Iraq, despite its authoritarianism and its willingness to use weapons of mass destruction, was the lesser evil. This calculus—that it was acceptable to arm and support a regime committing atrocities because the alternative was worse—defined American foreign policy in the region for decades.
The moral and strategic consequences of American support for Saddam during the Iran-Iraq War reverberated for decades. When Saddam invaded Kuwait in 1990, America fought to reverse the invasion but then left Saddam in power. When the US invaded Iraq in 2003, Iraqis who had been subjected to American-backed chemical weapons attacks during the Iran-Iraq War were among those fighting the American occupation.
The hidden history of American support for Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War was not a footnote to the Cold War. It was a central fact of Middle Eastern politics. It created enduring resentment against the US, demonstrated the hypocrisy of American claims to support human rights, and set a precedent that regimes aligned with American interests could commit atrocities without facing serious consequences.
Journal of Cold War Studies, 2007
Diplomatic History, 2005
Middle Eastern Studies, 2004
Continue Reading