By 1988, Iraq's Republican Guard had transformed from a revolutionary militia into the most advanced military unit in the Iraqi army. The Republican Guard's elite armored and mechanized divisions, particularly the Tawakalna Division, fought in the final offensives of the Iran-Iraq War with tactics and technology that presaged their role in later conflicts.

The Tawakalna Division

The Tawakalna Division was composed primarily of officers and men from the Sunni regions of Iraq and was considered the most reliable and combat-capable unit in the Iraqi military. By 1988, it was equipped with Soviet T-55 and T-72 main battle tanks, armored personnel carriers, and an array of artillery pieces.

In the final offensive operations of 1988, the Tawakalna led Iraqi mechanized advances against Iranian positions. The division operated with tactics designed to maximize Iraqi advantages in armor and firepower while minimizing exposure to Iranian human wave assaults. They dug in, used defensive positions to defeat Iranian attacks, and then conducted counterattacks to recapture lost territory.

The Final Offensives

The summer and fall of 1988 saw a series of Iraqi offensives aimed at recapturing territory and breaking the military stalemate. The Tawakalna participated in operations on multiple fronts, from the marshes south of Basra to the mountains of northern Iraq. They conducted coordinated infantry and armor assaults, worked with air support, and demonstrated a level of operational sophistication that surprised many Western observers.

Iranian defenses were deteriorating. The chemical weapons attacks on Halabja in March 1988 had broken Iranian morale in the north. Economically exhausted and militarily worn down, Iran was losing the will to continue the war.

The Preservation of Power

What made the Republican Guard's performance in 1988 significant was not that they defeated Iran—Iran was already in the process of accepting a ceasefire. What mattered was that the Tawakalna and other Republican Guard units preserved their military capability, their equipment, and their organizational cohesion for use in future conflicts.

When Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990, it was the Republican Guard that led the assault and held the occupation. When the US attacked Iraq in 2003, the Republican Guard put up fierce resistance. The institutional memory and tactical experience gained in the Iran-Iraq War would shape Iraq's military performance in subsequent conflicts.

The irony is that the Republican Guard's success in 1988 against an economically exhausted Iran may have reinforced Saddam's belief in the efficacy of military force to solve political problems. The ease of the final victory against Iran may have made him underestimate the resistance he would face when he invaded Kuwait and later when he confronted the US.