Lieutenant Colonel Hal Moore landed his 450-man battalion in a clearing called Landing Zone X-Ray on November 14, 1965 and immediately found himself surrounded by elements of three North Vietnamese Army regiments—approximately 2,000 men. The battle that followed was America's first major engagement with regular North Vietnamese forces, and it demonstrated with brutal clarity that this war would not be won by firepower and helicopters alone.

LZ X-Ray

North Vietnamese commander Lieutenant Colonel Nguyen Huu An recognized that his best tactical option was to 'grab the enemy by the belt'—stay so close to American positions that their overwhelming air and artillery superiority became unusable without hitting their own troops. NVA soldiers advanced to within grenade-throwing distance of Moore's perimeter. American soldiers fought in a 360-degree defense for two days and nights, with close air support sometimes delivering ordnance within 50 meters of their own positions.

LZ Albany: The Ambush

On November 17, the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry was marching from X-Ray when NVA forces ambushed the column from close range in elephant grass. The battalion, strung out in a column rather than a combat formation, was cut into pieces by fire from both sides: 155 Americans killed, approximately 120 wounded out of about 500. It was the costliest battle for American forces in Vietnam to that point.

The Lesson Learned and Unlearned

General Westmoreland interpreted Ia Drang as validation of the attrition strategy: American firepower could inflict casualties the North Vietnamese could not sustain. He was wrong about the sustainability assumption. The North Vietnamese also drew conclusions from Ia Drang—about the value of engaging close, about American reliance on helicopters and fixed landing zones. Both sides left Ia Drang thinking they understood what had happened.