General Norman Schwarzkopf and his staff had spent months planning the ground campaign. The initial concept was straightforward: a frontal assault on Iraqi positions. But Schwarzkopf, working with Army Lieutenant General Fred Franks Jr., reconsidered. They proposed instead an envelopment—a "left hook" that would drive the bulk of coalition forces far to the west, around Iraqi defenses, and then swing east to encircle and destroy the Republican Guard.

The plan was audacious and risky. It required moving 200,000 troops across 300 miles of desert, logistically supporting them, and coordinating a complex operation involving multiple nations and military services. It required Iraqi commanders to remain fixated on the wrong part of the battlefield. It required precise timing. If the Iraqis detected the movement and redeployed forces, the entire operation could collapse.

Secrecy was paramount. The coalition maintained a deception campaign that suggested the main effort would be an amphibious landing on the Kuwaiti coast or a frontal assault on Iraqi positions near the Saudi border. The media and Iraqi intelligence were saturated with hints of a coastal operation. Iraq deployed forces expecting the attack they expected, not the attack that was coming.

The repositioning began in late January 1991, under cover of the continuing air campaign. The U.S. VII Corps, commanded by Lieutenant General Franks, was the main striking force. The 1st Armored Division and 1st Infantry Division, along with the British 1st Armoured Division and other units, began moving west through the Saudi desert toward Iraq. The operation was conducted at night and in poor weather to avoid Iraqi reconnaissance.

The logistics were staggering. Fuel trucks, water tankers, supply convoys, ammunition dumps, field hospitals—all had to be moved west while supporting the troops currently in contact near the Kuwaiti border. The United States and Saudi Arabia had invested six months in building supply lines and bases. Now they had to move those supplies and support structures to the west to sustain an operation in the empty desert.

By February 23, the eve of the ground offensive, the left hook was in place. VII Corps had moved more than 200 miles west into the Iraqi desert. They were positioned to drive north into Iraq and then swing east to intercept the Republican Guard's expected withdrawal routes.

The ground war began on February 24 at 4 AM. The Iraqi forces near the Saudi border, where they expected the main assault, received a frontal attack from coalition forces. As predicted, Iraqi commanders committed their reserves to this sector, exactly as Schwarzkopf intended. While the Iraqi high command was focused on the wrong battle, the left hook swung into action.

VII Corps drove north into Iraqi territory. The 1st Cavalry Division screened the operation from the east. The 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment advanced as the cavalry screen, using its reconnaissance and light armor to detect enemy positions while avoiding decisive engagement. The weather cleared, and vast dust storms covered the desert. Under this cover, coalition forces advanced rapidly north and then began the eastward swing that would encircle the Republican Guard.

The Republican Guard, positioned north and east of Kuwait City, prepared for battle against forces approaching from the south. They were ready for a frontal assault. They were not prepared for an attack from the west and rear.

By February 26, as the left hook swung east, the Republican Guard found themselves in a catastrophic situation. Coalition forces were south of them, north of them, and now west of them. Iraqi commanders, their communications destroyed by the air campaign, could not coordinate a cohesive response. Units fought individually and were destroyed in detail.

The Battle of Medina Ridge, the Battle of 73 Easting, and dozens of smaller engagements unfolded across the desert as the left hook crashed into the Republican Guard. Iraqi tanks, based on Soviet designs and crewed by soldiers with no experience against a technologically superior enemy, were outmatched. American M1 Abrams tanks, equipped with superior optics and thermal sights, could detect and kill Iraqi tanks at ranges where the Iraqis could not even see their attackers.

The Republican Guard, Iraq's elite, was shattered. Some units fought and were destroyed. Others attempted to withdraw and were caught in the open, their columns strafed by aircraft and destroyed by artillery. By the time the 100-hour ground war ended on February 28, the Republican Guard was no longer a functioning military force.

Schwarzkopf's left hook had worked perfectly. It was the greatest envelopment since World War II, executed with precision and coordination that no one would have thought possible just months before. The Iraqi army was not just defeated. It was destroyed.