Stanley McChrystal took command of Task Force 714 in 2003. He understood that enemy leadership was the center of gravity. Killing the leadership would collapse organizations.

The F3EA cycle was straightforward: Find targets through intelligence, Fix them through surveillance, Finish them with raids, Exploit captured materials for intelligence, Analyze to find the next target. Each raid informed the next.

The pace accelerated dramatically. In 2004, JSOC conducted about 5 raids per night in Iraq. By 2008, that had increased to 20-25 per night. Information technology enabled it: shared databases, real-time drone video, networked intelligence analysis.

The results were impressive by conventional metrics. Al-Qaeda in Iraq was significantly degraded by 2008. Senior leaders were dead or captured.

But special operations became the primary tool of warfare. By 2010, more raids were conducted than conventional operations. The focus on killing leaders, while tactically successful, didn't necessarily achieve strategic objectives. In Iraq, killing al-Qaeda leaders didn't end the sectarian conflict.

SPECIAL Operations forces operated in relative secrecy and outside traditional oversight. Abuse of detainees and civilian casualties were easier to minimize or hide. The emphasis on tactical efficiency sometimes overshadowed strategic considerations.