
The 100 Hours: Timeline of the Ground War
Apr 20, 2026
3 min read · Intermediate

The Iraqi Air Force flies to Iran. In January 1991, as Desert Storm began, over 130 Iraqi aircraft flew to Iran rather than fight. Iran interned the planes and their crews for years. The aircraft were never returned.↗
As the air war turned catastrophic for Iraq, Iraqi pilots made an extraordinary decision: rather than fight the coalition, they flew their aircraft to Iran. Over 122 Iraqi jets, including advanced Soviet fighters, crossed the border and were impounded by Iran.
Iraq's decision to send fighter aircraft to Iran was politically extraordinary. Iran and Iraq had been enemies for most of the 1980s, fighting a brutal eight-year war. Iraq had invaded Iran in 1980. Iran had emerged from that war as the victor, if at a devastating cost. The two nations had only recently normalized diplomatic relations as part of international peace efforts.
Now, with coalition forces systematically destroying his air force, Saddam made a pragmatic if humiliating decision: send surviving aircraft to Iran for safekeeping. Iraqi pilots would fly them to Iranian airfields, land, and submit to Iranian custody. The aircraft would be impounded but preserved.
Over 122 Iraqi aircraft made the journey, including advanced MiG-29 fighters and Mirage F-1 jets—some of the most sophisticated aircraft in the Iraqi inventory. Iranian pilots and military officials received the aircraft, and Iraq formally requested that Iran preserve them for eventual return after the war.
From Iran's perspective, the offer was a windfall. Without firing a shot, they had acquired advanced Soviet and French aircraft. The aircraft represented combat capability that had cost Iraq tens of millions of dollars to acquire and years to train pilots on. Now Iran possessed them.
Saddam's decision to send aircraft to Iran was never formally acknowledged as such, but it was understood as a way to preserve asset value. Rather than lose the aircraft in combat or have them destroyed on the ground by coalition air strikes, they would be safe in Iranian storage. The hope was that after a ceasefire or settlement, Iran would return them.
Iran never did. The aircraft remained in Iranian possession after the war. Some were reportedly used to supplement Iran's own air force. Others were held in storage as strategic assets. The exact disposition of all 122 aircraft remains unclear, but Iran benefited significantly from their possession.
From Saddam's perspective, the decision was rational but represented a fundamental failure. The fact that he was sending his air force to an enemy nation for safekeeping demonstrated the degree to which his military situation was untenable.
The episode revealed the isolation of Iraq in the region. Iran, despite its nominal neutrality during the Gulf War, was quietly positioned to benefit. The two nations' mutual enmity did not prevent Iran from accepting and retaining Iraqi aircraft. From Iran's perspective, anything that weakened Iraq was strategically positive.
The long-term implications were that Iran's air force was subtly strengthened by Iraqi aircraft. When future conflicts would occur between Iran and other regional powers, or between Iran and the United States, Iran would have these captured Iraqi aircraft at its disposal, at least theoretically. The actual operational utility of the aircraft was limited by maintenance issues and pilot training, but the political gesture was significant.
The story of the Iraqi Air Force fleeing to Iran was a minor footnote to the Gulf War, but it captured larger themes: the desperation of Iraq's military situation, the region's complex balance of power, and the way that military assets acquired by one nation could benefit others through circumstance and opportunity.