The strategic logic behind Gallipoli was not unreasonable: forcing the Dardanelles to capture Constantinople would potentially eliminate Turkey from the war, open Black Sea supply routes to Russia, and possibly bring wavering Balkan states into the Allied camp. The execution was characterized by inadequate forces, fractured command, poor intelligence, and an opponent who had nine months of warning.

The Naval Failure

The campaign began as a purely naval operation in February 1915—British and French battleships attempting to force the straits by gunfire alone. The attempt failed when three battleships were sunk and three others disabled by a minefield on March 18. The mines had been laid by a single small Ottoman vessel eight days earlier. The decision to suspend the naval operation and shift to land gave the Ottomans—and their German adviser Liman von Sanders—five crucial weeks to prepare defensive positions.

The Landings

The ANZAC landing on April 25 went ashore approximately a mile north of the intended beach due to currents. The resulting terrain—steep ridges and ravines instead of gentle slopes—transformed an aggressive offensive plan into an immediate defensive fight. British forces at Cape Helles landed successfully but failed to exploit initial success. By the end of April 25, the commanding heights—the objective of the first day—remained in Ottoman hands.

The August Offensive

A fresh landing at Suvla Bay in August was commanded by officers who proved unable to push infantry inland with the required urgency. Ottoman reinforcements directed by Mustafa Kemal—the future Atatürk—sealed the gap. Evacuation was completed by January 1916. Paradoxically, it was the most competent operation of the entire campaign.