Combat Outpost Keating sat in the Kamdesh district of Nurestan Province in northeastern Afghanistan, near the border with Pakistan. At roughly 6,800 feet elevation, nestled in a river valley surrounded by steep mountainsides that rose another 3,000 feet, it was arguably the most remote and most isolated American military outpost in Afghanistan.

The outpost was built to disrupt supply lines from Pakistan, to support efforts to build a viable government presence in Nurestan, and to extend American control into the remote mountain regions. But being more remote than other bases didn't make it more effective. It was harder to resupply, harder to reinforce, and harder to defend.

By October 2009, the outpost was being operated by about 50-60 American soldiers and advisors from various units, plus about 40 Afghan soldiers and irregular fighters. The command was in transition; a new commander was taking over. The base was not at full strength.

On October 3, shortly before dawn, insurgents attacked. Later estimates suggested that between 250 and 300 fighters—Taliban, al-Qaeda, and local militants—had organized a coordinated assault. They attacked from multiple directions, attempting to overwhelm the small garrison through sheer numbers and ferocity.

The defense was desperate and heroic. The small force fought from pre-positioned defensive positions, called in air support, and managed to hold the perimeter despite being outnumbered nearly six to one. The battle lasted many hours. American helicopter gunships arrived and engaged the enemy. Fighter jets conducted air strikes. But the fighting was intense and casualties mounted.

When the battle ended, eight American soldiers were dead and 25 more were wounded. One Afghan soldier was also killed. But the outpost held. The attack had failed, not because American firepower was superior (the enemy had the advantage of numbers and initial surprise), but because the American soldiers fought with extraordinary determination and skill.

Two soldiers were subsequently awarded the Medal of Honor. Ty Carter, a specialist, led reinforcements to a wounded soldier, risking his own life to try to save his comrade. Clint Romesha, a staff sergeant, coordinated the defense and personally engaged enemy fighters despite being wounded. Both were recognized for extraordinary valor.

But the victory came at great cost, and more importantly, it raised the fundamental question that plagued the Afghanistan War: why? What strategic objective justified the presence at Combat Outpost Keating? What was being accomplished by maintaining such a vulnerable base in such a remote location?

The base commander at the time, Captain John Rerostrom, had questioned the value of the outpost. In fact, there was already a decision to close the base within weeks of the October 3 attack. The higher command had determined that the outpost served no vital strategic purpose and was a drain on resources.

Within days of the battle, the decision to close the outpost was executed. Combat Outpost Keating was abandoned. The American forces withdrew. Within months, the Taliban had returned to the area. The effort to build a government presence in Kamdesh had failed. The remoteness of the region meant that without American soldiers permanently stationed there, government authority dissolved.

The battle of Kamdesh thus became the last major engagement at an outpost that the military was already planning to abandon. The soldiers fought with extraordinary courage and skill, but for a position that would not be held. The strategic irrelevance of the location would, in the years that followed, seem to epitomize the larger strategic question: what were American soldiers doing in these remote mountains?

The medals for valor made sense. The individual soldiers deserved recognition. But the institutional questions about strategy and purpose would remain unanswered.