The Korengal Valley is narrow and steep, running north-south for about 15 kilometers, with precipitous mountainsides on either side rising 4,000 feet. The valley had been the site of fighting between American forces and Taliban and al-Qaeda fighters since 2006. It was some of the most difficult terrain in Afghanistan.

Vehicle Patrol Base Kahler sat near the entrance to the valley, positioned to monitor traffic in and out. In July 2008, the base was being reestablished and consolidated. A new combat outpost was being established at Wanat, further up the valley. The idea was to create a presence higher up in the valley to extend American influence and prevent Taliban movement.

On July 12, a small unit from the 2-27 Infantry (part of the 25th Infantry Division) arrived to establish the outpost. They were working on the base, preparing defensive positions, when at dawn on July 13, they were attacked from multiple directions. Fighters were on the mountainsides, pouring machine gun and RPG fire down onto the soldiers below.

The base had not been fully fortified. The defensive perimeter was not complete. Ammunition caches were not yet positioned. The soldiers were still setting up when the attack came. It was one of the most coordinated and well-executed attacks on an American base in Afghanistan.

The fighting lasted several hours. The soldiers fought with remarkable courage, calling in air support, returning fire, and trying to stabilize their position. But the enemy had the advantage of height and surprise. By the time the firefight ended, nine Americans were dead and many more were wounded.

The names matter: Staff Sergeant Jason Mike, Sergeant First Class Jared Monti, Specialist Zachary Boyd, Private Joshua Kirk, Private First Class Gunnar Zwilling, Private Jonathan Asa Owensby, Private First Class Brandon Dillon, Private First Class Christopher Elmore, and Specialist Jonathan Gajewski. Men from across America who died in a valley that most Americans had never heard of.

Sergeant Jared Monti was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor for his actions during the battle. He had been trying to rescue a wounded Afghan fighter when he was killed. But his Medal of Honor citation also raised the question that dominated the after-action review: why was this outpost placed in such a vulnerable location, with limited defensive positions and limited ability to provide support if attacked?

The brigade commander maintained that the outpost was necessary to disrupt Taliban and al-Qaeda movement through the valley. But critics argued that the base served no strategic purpose, that the valley was tactically impossible to defend, and that placing soldiers in such an exposed position was a needless risk.

The battle of Wanat became emblematic of the larger question that haunted the Afghanistan War: for what? What strategic objective justified the presence in the Korengal Valley? What was being accomplished that was worth the loss of life?

By 2010, the outposts in the Korengal were withdrawn. The valley was abandoned to the Taliban. No strategic objective was left behind, because none had ever been clearly articulated. But the cost remained: nine soldiers dead, dozens more wounded, and the families that would never recover from that day in July 2008.