U-2 reconnaissance photograph of Soviet MRBM missile site in Cuba, October 1962. CIA / National Archives.↗
From October 16–28, 1962, the United States and Soviet Union came closer to nuclear war than at any other point in history. The crisis was resolved through a combination of direct negotiation, back-channel diplomacy, and significant mutual concessions that neither side fully disclosed at the time.
The Cuban Missile Crisis was the product of three intersecting miscalculations. Khrushchev miscalculated that the Kennedy administration, weakened by the Bay of Pigs failure, would accept Soviet missiles in Cuba as a fait accompli. Kennedy's ExComm initially miscalculated that Soviet missiles in Cuba were the primary threat, rather than the Khrushchev-Kennedy relationship's overall instability. And both sides miscalculated how little control they would have over the crisis once it escalated.
On October 14, 1962, U-2 reconnaissance aircraft photographed Soviet SS-4 medium-range ballistic missile sites under construction in Cuba. Within 24 hours, Kennedy was informed; within 48, ExComm had begun deliberating. The range of these missiles—approximately 1,100 nautical miles—placed most major American East Coast cities within strike range. The air strike option was rejected when military planners could not guarantee 100% destruction of missile sites before launch capability was established.
Kennedy announced the crisis publicly on October 22 and established a naval 'quarantine.' The confrontation reached its first climax on October 24, when Soviet cargo ships were steaming toward the quarantine line. At 10:25 AM, intelligence reported that Soviet ships had stopped or were turning back. Secretary of State Dean Rusk told McGeorge Bundy: 'We're eyeball to eyeball, and I think the other fellow just blinked.'
The public resolution involved Soviet withdrawal of the missiles in exchange for American pledges not to invade Cuba. What was not disclosed publicly for decades: Kennedy also secretly agreed to remove American Jupiter missiles from Turkey within several months. Both sides could claim victory; both had compromised. Thirteen days of maneuvering past nuclear war through statesmanship, luck, and the moderating influence of military advisers who told their political masters clearly what a nuclear exchange would mean.
W.W. Norton, 1969
W.W. Norton, 1997
Harvard University Press, 1997
On April 24, 1980, a US special operations mission to rescue American hostages in Tehran failed catastrophically in the Iranian desert. Eight Americans died without ever reaching Tehran. The disaster forced a complete restructuring of US special operations capability.
From 1979 to 1989, the Soviet Union fought a counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan it could not win. The war cost 15,000 Soviet lives, exposed the limits of superpower military power, and accelerated the USSR's collapse.
In June 1948, the Soviet Union blockaded West Berlin, cutting off 2.5 million people from all land supply routes. For 15 months, Western aircraft flew food, coal, and medicine in round the clock. Stalin blinked.
