Australian troops landing at ANZAC Cove, Gallipoli, 25 April 1915. State Library of New South Wales.↗
The 1915 Gallipoli campaign was designed to knock Ottoman Turkey out of the war and open a supply route to Russia. Instead it consumed 250,000 Allied casualties and accomplished nothing. Every failure was predictable.
The strategic logic behind Gallipoli was not unreasonable: forcing the Dardanelles to capture Constantinople would potentially eliminate Turkey from the war, open Black Sea supply routes to Russia, and possibly bring wavering Balkan states into the Allied camp. The execution was characterized by inadequate forces, fractured command, poor intelligence, and an opponent who had nine months of warning.
The campaign began as a purely naval operation in February 1915—British and French battleships attempting to force the straits by gunfire alone. The attempt failed when three battleships were sunk and three others disabled by a minefield on March 18. The mines had been laid by a single small Ottoman vessel eight days earlier. The decision to suspend the naval operation and shift to land gave the Ottomans—and their German adviser Liman von Sanders—five crucial weeks to prepare defensive positions.
The ANZAC landing on April 25 went ashore approximately a mile north of the intended beach due to currents. The resulting terrain—steep ridges and ravines instead of gentle slopes—transformed an aggressive offensive plan into an immediate defensive fight. British forces at Cape Helles landed successfully but failed to exploit initial success. By the end of April 25, the commanding heights—the objective of the first day—remained in Ottoman hands.
A fresh landing at Suvla Bay in August was commanded by officers who proved unable to push infantry inland with the required urgency. Ottoman reinforcements directed by Mustafa Kemal—the future Atatürk—sealed the gap. Evacuation was completed by January 1916. Paradoxically, it was the most competent operation of the entire campaign.
Oxford University Press, 2001
Overlook Press, 1999
Reed New Holland, 2004
On November 20, 1917, 476 British tanks rolled forward at Cambrai without a preliminary bombardment and punched a six-mile hole in the German line. Within two days, a German counterattack had taken most of it back.
From August 8 to November 11, 1918, the Allied armies conducted 100 days of continuous offensive operations that shattered the German army. This period—not the trench years—represents the zenith of WWI military art.
On July 1, 1916, the British Army suffered 57,470 casualties—the worst single day in its history. The Battle of the Somme would continue for four more months. Understanding why requires understanding what the generals actually knew.
